Study objective: Policymakers increasingly regard centralization of emergency care as a useful measure to improve quality. However, the clinical studies that are used to justify centralization, arguing that volume indicators are a good proxy for quality of care ("practice makes perfect"), have significant shortcomings. In light of the introduction of a new centralization policy in the Netherlands, we show that the use of volume indicators in emergency care is problematic and does not do justice to the daily care provided in emergency departments (EDs).
INTRODUCTION Background
Centralization is increasingly seen as a suitable policy instrument to improve quality, safety, and efficiency of emergency care in the United States and other Western health care systems. [1] [2] [3] As a result of centralization, complex emergency care for ST-segment elevation myocardial infarction, stroke, major trauma, and pediatric critical care is increasingly provided in a smaller number of emergency departments (EDs). 4 Policymakers and insurance companies stimulate further centralization by using volume indicators, which means that an ED has to perform a minimum number of treatments (a threshold) to be granted permission to perform that treatment (eg, the Leapfrog purchasing principles 5 ). The basic premise behind the use of volume indicators is that the more frequently health care professionals perform a certain treatment, the better the outcomes are ("practice makes perfect"). Also, high-tech, expensive equipment and machines are used more efficiently.
This trend in emergency care is in line with other fields in health care in which volume indicators have been driving centralization, such as oncology and cardiology. 6, 7 However, the evidence on the volume-quality relation in emergency care is mixed and inconclusive. Research from the United Kingdom on acute stroke services on the one hand shows that centralization in metropolitan areas is negatively correlated to mortality, length of hospital stay, and cost per patient. 3, 8 Centralization also seems beneficial for patients with major traumas. 1, 9 A study on the volumequality relation of the treatment of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease exacerbations, on the other hand, suggests that high-volume EDs perform worse, perhaps as a result of ED crowding. Patients from high-volume EDs were more likely to experience early relapse or to report Volume 69, no. 6 : June 2017
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Editor's Capsule Summary
What is already known on this topic Centralization of health care services is often justified by a presumed causal association between volume and quality.
What question this study addressed
This study used a sociologic case study of centralization policy in the Netherlands to explore emergency department (ED) practitioners' construction of what constitutes quality care in emergency medicine and how it is captured (or not) in ED metrics.
What this study adds to our knowledge Responses suggested there are 4 overlapping repertoires of care, of which only 1 (acute and complex care) seems positively affected by centralization.
How this is relevant to clinical practice
This study supports the idea that quality is not well captured by a reductionist framework, and that centralizing policies risk missing unintended consequences by not addressing all 4 care repertoires.
ongoing exacerbation. 10 Another study also reported a negative correlation between volume and performance, showing that high-volume EDs have longer lengths of stay, higher rates of leaving without been seen, and longer doorto-physician times. 11 
Goals of This Investigation
To obtain a clearer picture of the (dis)advantages of centralization of emergency care, policymakers often call for more quantitative clinical studies on the relation between volume and quality. In this article, however, we critically discuss some assumptions that underlie volume-quality reasoning, in particular in emergency medicine, and plea for the use of qualitative research to complement the existing evidence. As an example of such an approach, we present a study of the introduction of a new policy on Dutch emergency care. The policy aims at centralization of care according to volume indicators. By conducting interviews and observations in EDs, we gain insight in daily emergency care practices and assess whether centralization might improve quality of care. Our research question is, what constitutes good care in EDs and how does that relate to policies of centralization, such as the new policy in the Netherlands? We do not aim to provide definitive answers to this question, but hope to inspire a "research for policy agenda" that combines quantitative volume-quality studies with qualitative detailed studies of emergency care, looking beyond volume indicators and centralization to improve quality of care. Before turning to the Dutch empirical case, we discuss some of the problems in volume-quality research.
We have stated in the introduction that the evidence on the volume-quality relation in emergency care is mixed. But there are good reasons to critically assess even the studies that suggest a clear correlation. In the following section, we distinguish 5 reasons why volume indicators are a problematic proxy for quality of emergency care and thereby pose serious concerns as an evidence base for policymaking.
First, many volume-quality studies have methodological problems. A meta-analysis of systematic reviews of studies on the volume-quality relation showed that most of the studies have methodological shortcomings (eg, they do not correct adequately for case mix). 12 As a result, the strength of the volume-outcome relation varies widely between studies. Also, studies show large differences between facilities that meet volume criteria: outliers exist across the whole spectrum of hospital and surgeon-surgical team caseload. 12, 13 For example, a study on esophagectomy outcomes showed that hospitals meeting volume standards varied by a factor of 5 in terms of 90-day mortality. 14 Despite the intuitive appeal of practice makes perfect, the few studies that investigated whether performance improves during a longer period as a result of increased experience did not find a relationship between volume and quality. 12 Second, there is disproportionate attention for studies that find a positive volume-quality relation. Because of a focus on studies that find a positive correlation between volume and outcome, studies that have failed to find this correlation are often neglected in the policy debate. There are a large number of treatments for which studies show that such a correlation is absent, including total hip arthroplasties, gynecologic malignancy, and major colorectal surgery. 12 This does not even take into account the studies that have never been published as a result of publication bias in clinical research.* 15 Another metaanalysis of systematic reviews found a positive volumequality relation for only a small number of complex, high-risk treatments. 16 Yet managers and physicians use the "volume argument" often as a justification for strategic choices of hospitals, such as merger or organizational *Publication bias means that studies with statistically significant results are more likely to be submitted and published than work with null or nonsignificant results.
restructuring, even when the consequences for quality of care are unknown. 16 Third, positive volume-quality relations might work the other way around ("selective referral"). Another problem with the volume-quality relation is statistical. When studies find a positive correlation, there is often no guarantee that centralization led to better quality. The causality could also work the other way around because of selective referral: patients are referred to facilities that have a good reputation and perform well, leading to an increase in patient volume. In that case, volume is the result of physician and hospital performance as perceived by patients and referrers. In practice, there might be both practice makes perfect and selective referral, but we have little insight into how the 2 mechanisms relate. 17, 18 Fourth, studies on volume-quality pay insufficient attention to the "social fabric" of care. There is a danger that centralization leads to quality improvement for one treatment, or on one dimension of quality, but to a loss of quality for other treatments or on other dimensions. That is, centralization of a treatment can have adverse consequences, such as logistic difficulties and higher costs for parallel reorganization of associated services, which are overlooked in studies with a narrow focus on specific treatments. Also, centralization could cause longer travel distances for patients, which is an important dimension of quality in emergency situations. It is therefore important to take the social fabric of care, ie, the embeddedness of a treatment in its clinical, organizational, and geographic environment, into account when centralization policies are assessed. In discussions on the centralization of emergency care, this is often not the case. 19 Fifth, volume-quality studies tend to focus on outcomes that are easily measured. In most studies on the volumequality relation, 30-day inhospital mortality is used as an indicator for quality of care. 12 The advantage of mortality as an outcome indicator is that it is often easily available and measurable. A disadvantage, however, is that it is not a good indication of quality of care for treatments of nonlethal conditions. 20 Because of the focus on mortality in volume-outcome studies, alternative elements of quality are ignored, including, for example, quality of life for patients or patient-centered care (which are more difficult to measure). The focus on outcomes that are easy to measure is not limited to volume-quality studies, but can be observed in other fields as well; for example, in the development of clinical guidelines. 21 Despite the problems that are associated with volumequality studies, they are widely used as a ground for centralization. An example is a new policy for emergency care in the Netherlands, issued by the umbrella organization for the health insurance companies that are responsible for contracting care from hospitals (Association of Health Insurers). The association based the policy on a review of clinical studies on emergency care and proposes centralization of 6 acute and high-risk categories of services: severe physical trauma, acute neurology, acute cardiology, acute vascular surgery, acute obstetrics and "other" (a list of approximately 40 conditions). Each category contains a number of treatments. For example, acute neurology includes treatment of stroke, meningitis, and epilepsy. For each category, the policy uses volume-quality studies on the most acute and severe conditions as a proxy for the other conditions. In the case of acute neurology, studies on stroke are used. In accordance with these studies, the policy prescribes a minimum number of 350 stroke patients per year for an ED. Facilities that have fewer stroke patients will not be reimbursed for the whole range of acute neurology. The same mechanism goes for the other categories, in which a minimum number of treatments of the most acute and severe conditions is used as a proxy for the whole range of services within that category. As a result, only a small number of large hospitals that perform the threshold number of treatments would be reimbursed for the 6 categories of services. The policy proposes that emergency care that does not fall in 1 of the 6 categories be delivered in thus-far-unspecified "facilities for basic emergency care." 22 
MATERIALS AND METHODS Study Design and Setting
To investigate the feasibility of the proposed policy in the Netherlands in relation to daily emergency care practices and to generate lessons for centralization policies in other health care systems, we carried out ethnographic research in and around EDs. By using different research methods, we ensured data triangulation. 23 We conducted 109 hours of observation during a period of 10 weeks in 3 hospitals, Riverside Hospital, Countryside Hospital, and UrbanCare Hospital; a primary care facility; and a regional ambulance call center (see Appendix E1, available online at http://www.annemergmed.com, for more information about the fieldwork sites). The sites are representative for Dutch emergency care in terms of size and geographic location. Management of the 2 smaller hospitals, Riverside and Countryside, expected that they would have to downgrade their ED to a basic care facility, aimed at smaller groups of patients with less complex disease, if the new policy were implemented. UrbanCare would probably experience an increase in the number of emergency care patients.
We conducted observations during different times of the day at each of the sites until we reached a point of saturation, ie, additional observations did not generate new insights. The goal of the observations was to openly investigate the daily practice of emergency care and to look for what in ethnographic research are known as "golden events," situations that help one understand how a site works. 24 During the observations, we conducted ethnographic interviews 25 that lasted up to 30 minutes with more than 30 physicians, general practitioners, residents, nurses, ambulance drivers, physician assistants, and managers. In particular, we discussed the background or rationale behind some of the events we witnessed during the observations. In addition, we conducted 5 semistructured follow-up interviews 26 to further explore some of our findings from the observations and ethnographic interviews (see Appendix E1, available online at http://www.annemergmed.com, for more information about the follow-up interviews). We took field notes during the observations and ethnographic interviews, which we wrote down directly afterward. The follow-up interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim.
Primary Data Analysis
We analyzed our material inductively 27 in 3 rounds. First, we looked at the different types of patients who entered the EDs. Second, we analyzed the way professionals dealt with those patients. Third, we looked at the organizational processes and structures that were in place to provide care to patients. We did not take the 3 analytic steps sequentially and only after our empirical research, but alternated during the research process to confirm and challenge the patterns that emerged from our findings. In accordance with this process, we identified 4 repertoires of emergency care. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a repertoire as "a stock or range of regularly performed or easily exhibited skills, techniques, abilities, etc; a collection of typical features." Just as the performance of an artist depends on the skills that he or she possesses and exhibits in a given arena, so also do emergency care professionals adapt their medical and organizational skills to a certain context and the needs of patients. The use of the repertoire metaphor therefore allowed us to analyze the work that professionals perform in relation to the organizational setting, the characteristics of patients, and their idea of what good care is. We validated the 4 repertoires through member check 23 with the respondents in the 3 EDs, who confirmed that the 4 repertoires were representative of their work. Respondents also indicated that most patients do not fit neatly in one of the categories, but can often be placed in several categories or change from one category to another when the initial diagnosis changes. We therefore present the repertoires not as a blueprint, but as a heuristic for developing a broad policy perspective on emergency care.
RESULTS
In this section, we discuss 4 repertoires of emergency care (Table) . For each repertoire, we describe an illustrative situation that we encountered during our observations and explored further through ethnographic and semistructured interviews. Although one repertoire is dominant in each of the situations, elements of other repertoires can be recognized as well. This illustrates the complex and layered character of emergency care.
The first repertoire comprises the acute and complex care that features prominently in the new policy of the Association of Health Insurers. Good quality of care in this repertoire is defined in clinical terms; for example, mortality rate after a myocardial infarction. Out of the 4 repertoires, this is the one we observed the least in the smaller hospitals in our study (Riverside and Countryside). During our observations at the ambulance call center, we noticed that acute and complex cases were usually referred to one of the larger hospitals in the region, where specialized physicians and technologic infrastructure that are necessary for adequate treatment are available, and not to EDs in small hospitals. However, small hospitals also sometimes have to deal with acute and complex cases. Some patients have to be stabilized at the nearest facility before they can be transferred to a larger, more specialized facility. Other patients come to the ED with complaints that turn out to be more serious than initially thought.
Riverside Hospital: Small ED in an Urban Area The telephone rings at the ED desk. Sandra, † the secretary, answers it and hears a man calling from a car, saying that he is coming in with his almost 2-year-old daughter. The little girl is limp and has respiratory problems. Sandra looks for information about the girl in her electronic patient file and finds that she came to the ED 2 weeks ago with the same complaints. The girl was then given antibiotics and sent home. Sandra says to Bart, the coordinating emergency care nurse, that the girl is on the way and that she expects it to be nothing serious this time either. A few minutes later, a car stops in front of the ED. The father jumps out of the car, lifts his daughter from the backseat, and runs through the door. The mother of the girl climbs behind the wheel and parks the car. Sandra and 2 other emergency care nurses bring the little girl and her father to the examination room, leaving the few patients already waiting with lower urgency scores to the other professionals. The complaint turns out to be something serious and the girl is transferred to a children's treatment room. The girl cries and moans constantly and has a dangerously low oxygen saturation level. She is pale and keeps fainting or falling asleep. Tom, a resident, goes straight to the treatment room while Bart calls a pediatrician. The pediatrician arrives shortly because he was still in the hospital. A little while later a woman comes into the ED, throws down her coat, and goes straight to the treatment room. She is a second, more experienced pediatrician who was also called.
After an intense time, the child is stabilized and admitted to the pediatrics department at the hospital. One of the emergency care nurses says, "A little while ago, when we worked with the same team and the same pediatrician, we had a child who stopped breathing. That's why everything ran smoothly now: everyone knew what to do, but also where to find pediatric needles, oxygen masks, et cetera."
To provide good care in the first repertoire, professionals at the ED work as a team in which everyone does his or her specialized task. Nurses escort patients (and often ambulance personnel) directly after they arrive to a treatment room, prepare equipment, and hand out tools to residents and physicians. The latter perform the treatment, predominantly aimed at stabilizing patients. The more complex the case, the more rapidly specialized physicians are brought in and the more high-tech instruments are used. As the above case illustrates, practice makes perfect: experience and routines are important. During the first minutes after arrival at the ED, the pace is fast and all other patients who have less urgent conditions have to wait. After patients in this repertoire are stabilized, they are usually admitted to the hospital, often to the ICU, or transferred to a larger, more specialized hospital.
The second repertoire comprises patients with symptoms that are hard to classify at first sight. Sometimes these patients come to the ED by themselves; at other times they are brought in by ambulance. The complaints of these patients do not immediately lead to a diagnosis; for example, in the case of a patient who is short of breath and has a slight deviation on the ECG. As a resident stated in regard to such a patient he just admitted, "there's something funny about this patient; we just don't trust it." Another category comprises patients with chronic diseases who have a potential relapse; for example, a patient with a chronic heart condition and slight chest pain. The first step in dealing with these patients is making sure they are not in immediate danger, which would lead to repertoire 1. Next, they receive a diagnosis and are treated at the ED, often by a medical specialist. When this is finished, sometimes after several hours, patients are usually admitted to the hospital. Good quality of care in repertoire 2 is predominantly defined by the speed with which a patient receives a diagnosis and is treated and admitted, and the way initial uncertainty is communicated with a patient and other health care professionals.
Countryside Hospital: Small ED in a Rural Area A man walks in the ED with his wife and approaches the desk. He was sent in by a general practitioner and says he has severe abdominal pain. Mandy, an emergency care nurse, walks with the man to a treatment room. Five minutes later, Michelle, a resident, goes to the treatment room. After 15 minutes, Michelle comes back to the desk and starts a discussion with a resident, Greg, and a nurse, Sylvia, about the use of morphine. Michelle says that the patient scored an 8 out of 10 on the pain scale and that she gave him 10 mg of morphine. Greg and Sylvia both say that they do not like to give morphine in these situations; they have had better results with other painkillers. A few minutes later, Mandy returns to the desk and says that the morphine does not work: "No wonder, with such a body" (the patient is obese). Michelle decides to wait to prescribe other painkillers until the results from laboratory tests that she requested are there. Meanwhile, she enters the symptoms of the patient in the electronic patient file, making use of the protocol "acute abdominal pain." Michelle says that she suspects that the patient has acute pancreatitis. She also says that the patient told her that he drinks approximately 2.5 L of beer a day. Her diagnosis seems to be confirmed by the results from the laboratory test that appear on her screen approximately an hour later. She subsequently calls Jeff, a surgeon. This is necessary because the general practitioner who sent in the patient explicitly asked for the opinion of a surgeon. Michelle suspects that Jeff will confirm her diagnosis and will refer the patient to the internal medicine department. However, after Michelle discusses the symptoms of the patient and the results from the laboratory, Jeff thinks that it is not pancreatitis and says that he will come to the ED to examine the patient. In the meantime, Michelle orders a computed tomography scan at Jeff's request. She is still convinced that the patient has pancreatitis and grumbles about the fact that Jeff does not believe her.
After a short while, Jeff comes in and goes to see the patient in the treatment room, together with Michelle. When they come back to the desk, Jeff says that he thinks it is pancreatitis after all. He telephones a physician from the internal medicine department and, after a short conversation, gives the telephone to Michelle. He asks her to pass on all the relevant information and to make sure that the patient is admitted to the hospital. Fifteen minutes later, a nurse comes in and brings the patient to the internal medicine department.
Professional work in the second repertoire means dealing with uncertainty. Nurses, residents, and physicians have to come up with a diagnosis quickly, but may also need to alter their initial diagnoses after unexpected results from the laboratory or changes in symptoms. Professionals need to have broad medical and social knowledge to assess varied and complex symptoms and communicate well with patients (eg, for reassurance, to provide information) and colleagues (eg, about conflicting diagnoses). Knowledge of the medical background of patients is useful in this process. Nurses and residents also need to know what they can do by themselves and when it is time to consult a medical specialist. Good collaboration with other departments is crucial to admit patients to the hospital after they are treated at the ED. Doing so minimizes waiting time and frees capacity for new patients.
The third repertoire includes patients who have minor conditions, can be helped relatively easily, and go home quickly after treatment. Typical examples we encountered were patients with a sports injury, such as a sprained ankle, or patients with a rarer but medically still basic care need, such as having a fishhook stuck deep in their finger. These patients often come to the ED by themselves. Some of them receive a diagnosis and are then redirected to primary care facilities; others are treated in the hospital. In UrbanCare Hospital, the large hospital in our study, collaboration between emergency care and primary care was largely absent. As a consequence, "easy" patients were treated at the ED, which sometimes led to frustration among professionals who found this a waste of time and capacity. In Riverside and Countryside Hospitals, collaboration between the ED and the primary care facilities was good, with nurses as gatekeepers who decided in which facility a patient should be treated.
Riverside Hospital: Small ED in an Urban Area Two parents walk up to the desk. In the mother's arms is their 5-year-old daughter, who is weeping loudly. "We were so scared," says the mother. "We had a big mirror standing against the wall that we still had to put up. The thing weighs no less than 35 kilos. I never thought Maria could pull it over." However, Maria managed to do exactly that, and the mirror fell to pieces on her head and back. She is covered with little cuts. Lisa, the secretary, brings the family to the examination room, where Fatima, a nurse, immediately joins them. Fatima looks at the cuts and sees that there is still glass in some of them. Every time she touches Maria, the child cries loudly. Fatima asks some questions that are in the mandatory diagnostic protocol, but does not finish the protocol to make sure that Maria can quickly go to the treatment room.
Paul, another nurse, explains later that the protocol is primarily used as a guideline and that there can always be reasons to treat a patient with more urgency than is strictly medically necessary. Nurses use this discretion that the system provides in situations such as this: "If possible, we prioritize the treatment of children. Also pain relief is prioritized."
The third repertoire comprises care that is nonacute and noncomplex, but that can have quite an effect on patients. They are scared at times and not sure how to act. In this repertoire, professionals have to perform basic medical tasks, but they must also be able to communicate well with patients, sometimes referring them to another facility, comforting them if necessary, and informing them if they have to wait for other patients who must be treated with more urgency. Usually, low-tech medical equipment and basic medical skills suffice, although professionals have to have diagnostic competency to rule out potentially graver conditions. Quality of care comprises good medical outcomes-which is usually the easy part-short waiting times, and patient-friendly communication. Professionals realize that what is minor to them can be traumatic for patients (and their parents in the case of children).
The fourth repertoire comprises patients with a combination of physical, psychological, and social issues who often have only a minor medical condition but have nowhere else to go than the ED. An example is an elderly woman with multiple chronic conditions who does not have family or friends and is brought to the ED with very high blood sugar levels. Professionals at EDs are reluctant to send such patients home after treatment when they know there is no or insufficient home care available. However, they also know that there is often no medical reason to keep the patients at the hospital. This sometimes poses ethical dilemmas.
Riverside Hospital: Small ED in an Urban Area On a Saturday afternoon, Wendy, an emergency nurse, and Soraya, a resident, stand talking in a corner of the ED. Wendy's shift is already over, but she wanted to talk to Soraya about a patient, an elderly man, who came in the night before. The patient was sent in by his general practitioner and was examined at the ED by Soraya. Although the patient was not feeling well, Soraya decided that his condition was not medically serious enough to justify admission to the hospital. She sent the man home, although the nurses did not agree. They thought that the patient was vulnerable and weak. Moreover, they saw that his wife and daughter had trouble handling the situation. "But that is not what we are for," Soraya had said to the nurses, pointing out the risk that if the patient had to be admitted, it could lead to a long stay in the hospital, without a strict medical reason.
Because the resident has the final say, Wendy and the other nurses have no option but to accept that the patient was sent home. Later that night, however, the patient died. The nurses, especially Wendy, felt horrible about that. "Of course it is terrible for the patient, but I find it the worst for his wife and daughter. I really wish this situation would have gone differently. They already were in such terrible shape." Soraya, however, insists that at the time there was no medical reason to keep the patient in the hospital. She tells Wendy that she will call the family to express her condolences and that she regrets the whole situation, but that there was no other option.
Professional work in the fourth repertoire primarily entails making good diagnoses, providing adequate medical treatment (which can be difficult, as the example shows), and organizing care. The latter requires cooperation between EDs and home care, nursing homes, primary care, mental care, patients, and patients' families to prevent patients who cannot stay at the hospital from being left without care. Countryside Hospital belongs to a care group that also includes a home care organization and nursing homes, which made it easy to organize continuity of care. This mediated the risk of patients returning to an unsafe home environment. In Riverside Hospital, however, patients were often sent home without additional care or admitted to the hospital, where they sometimes resided for a considerable time because there was no other place they could go. In the absence of good collaboration with longterm care institutions, dealing with these multiproblem patients is challenging for ED professionals. Professionals have to be empathic but also clearly state to patients and relatives the limits of the care they can provide in the hospital. Furthermore, they have to distinguish medical from psychosocial complaints and act accordingly by either referring patients to other facilities or admitting them to the hospital.
LIMITATIONS
This study has several limitations. First, we chose fieldwork sites that are typical for Dutch emergency care in terms of size and geographic location, but we do not know whether the sites are completely representative. Despite that we observed the 4 repertoires in all of the EDs, contextual factors could have influenced the types of repertoire observed. Second, our analysis is based on the perspective of professionals and managers. We observed how patients reacted to the emergency care they received, but have not asked them directly about their experiences. Third, by investigating in detail what is occurring in EDs and deducing what would happen in a situation of further centralization in the Netherlands, we provide recommendations for research and policy. We cannot, however, predict with certainty what the consequences of centralization would be. This study merely points to the risks of centralizing emergency care according to a narrow and insufficiently empirically grounded understanding of it.
DISCUSSION
The analysis shows that emergency care is a multilayered practice in which various types of care repertoires coexist and overlap. Although patients do not always fit neatly in one repertoire, the distinction in 4 ideal types provides an analytic tool for researchers and policymakers to better understand emergency care. Each repertoire entails different perspectives on good care, the "good professional," and the "good organization," showing that improving emergency care requires a variety of instruments and interventions. The proposed new policy in the Netherlands is one sided because it is based on too narrow a definition of emergency care-paying attention to only the first repertoire-and has its evidence base almost exclusively in volume-quality studies, which we have shown to face inherent limitations. Although the details of our findings are particular to the Dutch context, the underlying mechanisms in each of the repertoires can probably be identified in other health care systems as well. Given the importance of the volume-quality relationship in debates internationally, we advise policymakers in others settings to take into account the warnings this study generated.
Earlier studies on stroke and trauma services have shown that volume might be a good proxy for quality in complex and acute situations. 1, 3, 8, 9 For these types of care, which make up the first repertoire and are predominantly provided in large hospitals, centralization could lead to quality improvement. However, if policy attention is geared only to the repertoire of acute and complex care, possibilities for improving quality of care in the other 3 repertoires will be left unexplored. Furthermore, this study indicates that centralization might even have negative, unintended consequences for patients in these repertoires because the requirements for providing good emergency care within the 3 repertoires are sometimes at odds. For example, centralization may lead to highly specialized professionals who do not have a broad enough scope to deal with complex diagnostics (repertoire 2), to crowding and longer waiting times for noncomplex patients (repertoire 3), and to insufficient attention for the coordination of care for multiproblem patients (repertoire 4). Neglecting the 3 nonacute and noncomplex repertoires, and the potential unintended consequences of centralization, might also hinder efficiency gains in the organization of emergency care. For example, without efforts to strengthen ties with long-term care providers and general practitioners, treating patients in the repertoires of basic care and physical, mental, and social care continues to lead to inappropriate utilization of EDs.
This study does not generate ready-to-use recommendations for an alternative organization of emergency care. It aims to open up current policy discussions by showing that emergency care is more diverse than policymakers often think and provides directions to improve quality of care in other ways than just centralization.
First, it calls for a broad research agenda to support emergency care policies 28 : a combination of quantitative outcome-oriented studies and detailed qualitative analyses of the daily practice of emergency care. Among other things, qualitative studies could focus on processes of selective referral versus practice makes perfect and on the social fabric of emergency care, ie, the clinical, financial, and organizational effect of centralization of emergency services on other types of care. Also, future studies could validate the 4 repertoires in a larger number of hospitals, preferably internationally, and study the repertoires from the perspective of patients.
Second, our analysis suggests that volume-driven centralization is at best a crude measure for improving quality of emergency care. Future studies and policies could take into account literature that yields a much broader perspective on quality improvement; for example, training clinical staff in a broad range of skills, improving regional collaboration between health care providers, and integrating EDs and primary care facilities. 29, 30 These studies could also pay attention to the unintended consequences of centralization on the whole of emergency care, and also on the nonacute and noncomplex repertoires.
Third, this study calls for the use of a variety of quality indicators, in addition to mortality that is dominant now but is mainly suitable for the repertoire of acute and complex care. Potential structure, process, and outcome indicators include patient satisfaction, waiting and travel time, availability of medical specialists, collaboration between EDs and other facilities, and the presence of flex tracks and fast tracks for low-complex patients. 31 Such broadening of the perspective on quality improvement seems promising to help develop more nuanced policies that are sensitive to the diversity of emergency care.
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